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BFXNAD WOLF.MAN t
"Federal Tax Policy and the Support of Science" poses for me a
basic issue which may not appear to be central to those whose orientation differs from mine. To some, the subject may call for inquiry
into how our federal tax laws encourage scientific endeavor. Others
may see in it the question whether our federal tax laws impede scientific activity and, if so, how the impediments may be removed. Still
others may interpret it as asking whether our tax policymakers have
given insufficient recognition to the advancement of science as a
national goal. The premise underlying that interpretation of the issue
is that science, given its proper recognition, will command the increased
interest and support from tax policymakers which it deserves.'
* This paper was prepared for and delivered in condensed form on April 8, 1965,
to the Conference on Law and the Social Role of Science held in New York City
under the auspices of the Rockefeller Institute and Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law. A collation of the proceedings of the conference will appear shortly in
a book to be published by the Rockefeller Institute Press.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1946, LL.B. 1948, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1By "science" I mean, as Professor David F. Cavers has suggested, "the body
of knowledge-or system of hypotheses-concerning the structure and processes of
nature, or that body of applied knowledge we call technology, or the process whereby
both bodies of knowledge are acquired, or the array of scientists and engineers who
are learned in them." Professor Cavers proffered this definition in his paper, 'aw
and Science: Some Points of Confrontation," April 8, 1965 (delivered at the Conference on Law and the Social Role of Science, Rockefeller Institute). His paper
will appear in the book collating the proceedings to be published by the Rockefeller
Institute Press.
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I can understand these approaches and others like them, but they
are not mine. As I view it, the problem is one of inquiry directed to
delineation and exposure of the circumstances that might call for a
special relationship between federal tax law and science. This focus
does not encompass the broader, different question of the extent to
which the federal government should support science. It involves instead the suitability of the tax system as a vehicle to provide the support. It requires a determination of the conditions that may justify
the use of federal tax law to stimulate or reward scientific pursuit and
achievement
The fact is, of course, that the federal tax system has been used
for years as a way of providing financial support for science. In many
respects tax support of science resembles a direct federal expenditure;
in many respects, it differs. Like a subsidy, tax relief shifts the
financial burden from the recipient of the benefit to the rest of the
population. The tax vehicle does not lead to a new source of funds;
it does not move from a limited to an unlimited source of funds for
ventures which the federal government seeks to support. The pie (to
change the metaphor) is essentially the same; tax relief is a different,
sometimes preferable, usually duller, knife with which to slice it.
A federal expenditure rarely takes the form of a carte blanche,
for its purposes are specified. Before disbursements are made administrators must be reasonably satisfied within guidelines laid down by
Congress that the beneficiaries of a grant, subsidy or contract will
use the money appropriated for the purposes specified. Recipients
may be required to report to federal agencies on their progress and
ultimate results, and funds may be made available only in installments,
as work progresses and as reports are received and reviewed. More
often than not, right or wrong, Congress directs federal expenditure
to particular objectives only when it believes the probability of attainment is more than just speculative. In contrast, the specific objectives
for which tax relief is granted are left largely to private individuals to
fashion and seek. Moreover, tax relief allows substantial opportunity
for diversity and experimentation, for action, speedy or deliberative,
with federal direction or supervision virtually nonexistent.
The issue then is the choice, or criteria for the choice, between
two approaches to securing the federal government's financial support
for science--expenditure versus tax relief. The choice may not always
have to be one or the other, but it must at least be how much of one
and how much of the other.
2 My use of the word "justify" suggests a point of view which places the burden
of persuasion on those wishing to use the tax laws to support science. For reasons
which I hope will become clear, that is my point of view.
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I. THE CONCEPT OF A TAX "PREFERENCE"
Last year Congress budgeted fifteen billion dollars for expenditures in support of scientific activity.3 The techniques of expenditure-grants, subsidies, contracts, and loans-are well known. The
preferential tax provisions that provide support for science are less
familiar. I will therefore review several of these provisions as a basis
for comparison and to help identify guidelines that are relevant to the
choice between expenditure and tax relief. But first I want to explain
my understanding of a "preferential" or "special relief" provision.
Reference to a tax provision as "preferential" or "special" does
not connote opposition to the social or economic objective which
Congress has used the tax law to support. It does mean the provision
deviates from a norm. Implicit in the reference is the idea that the
income tax has an essential integrity; that there is a fundamental
standard for determining the tax base and the applicable rates; that
maintenance of the standard (restoration where it has been eroded)
is important to society, high on its scale of values; that the proponent
of a measure which deviates-which creates a preference--has a
burden of proof which goes as much to the use of the tax system as
the means of accomplishment as to the measure's specific social or
4
economic objective.
Let me illustrate with examples from the income tax of provisions
which I classify as "preferential," although they may support objectives (in science and elsewhere) for which there is a broad consensus:
Education is good; the law exempts scholarships and fellowships from
tax.' Financial support of state and local governments is good;
Congress has exempted the interest on their bonds from the federal

income tax.6 The erosion of land used in farming is bad; Congress
allows income tax deductions for expenditures designed to prevent
erosion.' Investment is good; gains from the sale of many investments
(so-called long term capital gains) are taxed at rates lower than those
8 See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENcES-NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL,
FEDERAL SUPPORT OF BASIC RESEARCH IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING (1964);
12 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT
AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC AcrnTms (1964).
4 Compare EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961); HELLERSTEIN,
TAXES, LOOPHOLES AND MORALS (1963) ; STERN, THE GREAT TREAsURY RAID (1964) ;
Blum, Tax Policy and Preferential Provisions in the Income Base, 51 KY. L.J. 233
(1962); Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform-Twenty Questions, 41 TAxEs 672
(1963) ; Klein, Federal Income Tax Reform-A Reaction to Professor Bluln's Twenty
Questions, 42 TAXES 175 (1965); Blum, More on "Twenty Questions," 42 TAXES

180 (1964).

6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 117.
6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103.
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 175.
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applicable to income from personal services.'
Individuals with inventive genius are valuable national assets; profits which they reap
from the sale of their patents are taxed only at the reduced rates
applicable to long term capital gains.' Scientific achievement is desirable; certain prizes and awards given in recognition are tax exempt."
The merit of each of those provisions is debatable. But wise or
unwise, each represents a departure from standard. The standard,
though eroded, is still visible in the maze we call the Internal Revenue
Code. From the beginning the income tax has been aimed primarily
at net income-the amount left after the taxpayer deducts from the
money he takes in the sums which he has expended in the pursuit of
his business activities. It is true that "gross income" and the deductions attributable to the expenses of earning it are unrefined at the
fringes. Some receipts (like gifts) and economic benefits (like the
imputed income from home ownership) have been excluded from the
tax base. Controversy continues as to the deductibility of expenses
(like those for travel and entertainment) which have a business nexus,
but smack heavily of consumption. Nevertheless the standard of net
income has persisted.
The rates which apply ordinarily in determining a taxpayer's
income tax liability are taken from a scale which, in the case of individual taxpayers, is graduated according to the amount of his taxable
income, with the rates progressing to higher levels as that income
increases.

The concept of "special relief" or "preference" means to me a deviation from a relatively neutral net income base or the application of
rates which are tailored according to the source from which income is
derived or the purpose for which it is spent. This does not imply
disagreement with the social or economic objectives of the preference
nor does it imply obstinate, inflexible insistence that the objectives not
be sought through the taxing mechanism. It does mean there is a
departure from standard.

II. TAx PREFERENCES FAVORING SCIENCE-A SAMPLING
My ultimate inquiry goes to the conditions which warrant departure from standard in support of science. To this end let us now
turn to some of the preferences in the federal income tax which favor
science either by deviating from a net income base with special exclusions and deductions or by providing reduced rates or even total
exemption.
8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-02.

91 0INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 74.
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A. The Deduction for Contributions
To some extent individuals have been allowed deductions for
"charitable contributions" since 1917; corporations have been permitted the deduction since 1936." This deduction provides a tax
benefit for those who choose to spend a portion of their disposable
income for charitable purposes. Scientific organizations, as well as
charitable and educational organizations, are among the familiar
groups to which such deductible "charitable contributions" may be
made.'
All of these organizations must be "nonprofit" in the sense
that their earnings must not inure to any person in any proprietary
sense, 3 but neither the statute nor the Treasury Regulations define
the term "scientific." The Regulations encompass any organization
whose activities are "carried on in furtherance of a 'scientific' purpose,"
expressly rejecting any distinction between an organization whose
research is "applied" or "practical" as opposed to "fundamental" or
"basic." 14 The Regulations require only that the activities be "in the
public interest," and not "of a type ordinarily carried on as an incident
to commercial or industrial operations .... ") 15
Although the Treasury Regulations show virtually no interest in
an organization's program content, they do delineate activities which
are thought not to be "in the public interest." 1 Familiar with the
ingenuity employed by taxpayers in their efforts to qualify for the
grace of a tax sheltering provision, the Treasury has attempted to
build a defense perimeter against expected claims for "scientific" classification brought by organizations which, though engaged in research
activities, may exist more to serve commercial or private interest than
the so-called public interest. Recently the Internal Revenue Service
"1 Today individuals may deduct up to 20% of their "adjusted gross income" for

"charitable contributions." In some cases the limit reaches 30%; in others, there
is no limitation. Where the 30% limitation is exceeded, provision is made for a
five year carryover. Corporations are limited to 5% of their "taxable income," with
a two year carryover. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 170. The estate and gift tax deductions for charitable contributions are unlimited. IxT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 2055,
2522.
12
INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, §170(c)(2)(B); cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 501(c) (3).
13 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c) (2) (C).
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (d) (5), as amended, T.D. 6525, 1961-1 Cum.
BULL. 187. Although the provisions of this regulation relate directly to scientific
organizations whose income is exempt from tax, they are the same scientific organizations to which deductible contributions may be made under § 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code. The Treasury Regulations issued under § 170 of the Code do not
deal definitionally with a "scientific" organization.
15Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (5) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6525, 1961-1

Cum. BuLL. 197.

16Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (d) (5) (iv) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6525, 1961-1
Cum. BuLL. 187. Compare Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(5)(iii) (1959), as
amended, T.D. 6525, 1961-1 CuM. BuLL. 187.
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had before it the case of a nonprofit organization engaged in research
directed toward the development of labor saving equipment in the
field of agriculture. Finding that the commercial interests being served
were paramount, the Service ruled that the organization did not qualify
as a "scientific" organization." This, not worthiness of project, is the
kind of issue which the tax statute and Regulations require Internal
Revenue Service personnel and ultimately the courts to resolve.
The deduction for contributions to scientific organizations has the
effect of reducing a taxpayer's taxable base by the amount of his
contribution. Taxpayers benefit in direct proportion to the marginal
rate of tax applicable to their highest income bracket. Stated otherwise,
a taxpayer with at least 100 dollars of income otherwise taxable at
the seventy percent rate will pay only thirty dollars of his "own" money
by making a 100 dollar contribution. The taxpayer whose marginal
rate is only twenty-five percent must pay seventy-five dollars of his
"own" money to make an identical contribution. Despite the federal
government's financial contribution, the use of the funds is limited to
a federal scrutiny no more pointed than that suggested by the Regulations' attempt to draw a perimeter around the term "scientific." It is
the individual contributor and the managers of the organization to
which he makes his contribution who determine the particular objectives to which his funds are devoted.
The deduction for contributions is perhaps the most significant of the preferential provisions benefiting science. Its principal
advantage is in providing a subsidy free of governmental red tape and
restraint. Its chief disadvantages lie in the unevenness and relative
arbitrariness of the subsidy and in the fact that the amount of the
subsidy is greater for the high income taxpayer than for the low.
Affluence more than interest, ingenuity, or worthiness determines the
extent of the federal support.
B. The Tax Exemption of Scientific Organizations
The income of scientific organizations to which deductible contributions may be made is exempt from federal income tax.' Thus
100 percent of the income of such scientific organizations may be available for use in their scientific endeavors. This tax exemption is
somewhat circumscribed however. In 1950 it was made inapplicable
to the income which an organization derives from "unrelated" business
activity."9 Since the primary purpose of this 1950 amendment was to
' Rev. Rul. 65-1, 1965 IxT. REv. BuLL. 14.
Is INT. REv. CODE 0F 1954, §§501 (a), 501(c) (3), 170.
19 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 511-14.
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mitigate the advantage a nonprofit organization has when it competes
with taxable business enterprises, Congress had to determine whether
a scientific organization's profits from contract research should be
treated as income from "unrelated" business. It made its determination
by drawing distinctions which, in one instance, depend on the source
of the organization's research income; in another, on the nature of the
organization performing the research; and, in the third, on the nature
of the research conducted.
All of the contract research profits of an exempt scientific organization remain free of tax if the research is undertaken for government
or an agency of government 2
The contract research profits of a
college, university or hospital are exempt irrespective of the source of
the income."' But the research profits of all other scientific organizations, not derived from a governmental source, are taxable unless,
according to the statute, the research is "fundamental" and "the
results . . . are freely available to the general public .

,,22 In their

meager effort to define "fundamental" research, the Treasury Regulations explain only that it is to be distinguished from "applied" research,
and that it excludes "research carried on for the primary purpose of
commercial or industrial application." '
What might be the justification for distinctions like these? Do
they reflect a congressional judgment that "fundamental" research is
to receive special encouragement? If so, why is this distinction eliminated in the case of a university? And why in the case of all scientific
organizations is the distinction eliminated if the research contract is
let by a government agency? 24
Without great difficulty one can rationalize these distinctions.25
Once in a tax statute, however, they tend toward permanence. Their
rationalization, whatever it may be, may not answer the question
whether such distinctions, reflected in a congressional judgment made
20

1954, § 512(b) (7).
1954, § 512(b) (8).
22 IxT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b) (9).
23 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.512(b) -1 (f) (3), (4) (1958).
24
It will be remembered that the distinction drawn between "fundamental" and
"applied" research in the exemption of a scientific organization's contract income is
not made in determining its qualification to receive a deductible contribution. See
INT. RL. CoDE OF
21 IxT. REv. CODE OF

text accompanying note 14 supra.
25
Congress may have decided that research undertaken by a university is likely
to be of unusual worth to society even though "applied," or that universities deserve
an extra edge in competing for work. Profits from contracts let by Goverment may
be exempt; though the research is "applied," in order to keep down direct governmental
costs. If private industry is expected to compete for applied research contracts,
however, the rationalizations do little to eliminate this gross interference with market
determinants. The exemption of "fundamental" research might be justifiable on the
ground, if it is the fact, that relatively few business enterprises compete for such work.
Cf. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950-2 Cums. Buu.m 483, 504-05.
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in 1950, have continuing validity in 1965. As the distinctions age
they become encrusted, not with new data from the scientific community, but with interpretive rulings and decisions of the accountants,
lawyers and judges who, in an adversary context, must adminster the
statute.
C. Scholarship and Fellowship Grants
The Internal Revenue Code provides in some detail for the exclusion from an individual's income of certain scholarship and fellowship grants.26 These are by no means limited to those for scientific
studies, but such studies are clearly within the ambit of coverage. In
the case of a student working towards an academic degree the excludable amount is unlimited; in other cases that amount is limited. In no
case, however, is the exclusion restricted to those pursuing particular
courses of study nor is there a limitation based on the size of the
recipient's income from other sources.
Should all scholarships and fellowships, like all "gifts," 2 be
excluded? Should none be excluded on the ground that the financial
benefit of the exclusion is not directed and limited to those who need
it, or to those educating themselves in specified fields such as science?
Should qualification for financial aid to education-scientific or otherbe determined by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts, as with
all the other special-tax relief provisions, or should the aid consist only
of subsidies administered by an agency like the Office of Education
or the National Science Foundation? 28 Internal Revenue Service
administration has required decisions in a growing number of cases
to determine not whether aid is needed or the pursuit worthwhile, but
whether a so-called "fellow" engaged in research activity is in effect
just working at a job, to be taxed on his earnings despite their
camouflage under a "fellowship" label. 9
D. Research and Experimental Expenditures
Ordinarily the businessman must compute his taxable income without a deduction for his capital expenditures." Those expenditures reduce taxable income through annual depreciation or amortization
charges which are deductible over the productive life of the assets
1954, § 117.
1954, §102; cf. Rev. Rul. 61-66, 1961-1 Cum. BuLi. 19.
28 Cf. Higher Education Act of 1965, H.R. 9567, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
Compare IT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 168(e).
29 See, e.g., the rulings and cases digested in 1965-1 CCH STAND. FED. TAx REP.
1179.017-.12. Compare Rev. Rul. 65-59, 1965 INT. REv. Buu.m No. 12, at 7, with
Rev. Rul.
65-117, 1965 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 18, at 7.
0
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 263.
26 INT. REV. CODE OF
27 INT. REV. CODE OF
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which they have purchased.'
In some cases, however, the cost of
capital expenditures (like those for goodwill) is recoverable only
when the acquired asset or the business of which it is a component
is sold."
The businessman with a laboratory, however, is one with a preference. He is of course entitled to the accelerated depreciation 3 3 and
investment credit 4 made available in recent years to taxpayers quite
generally. But in addition he has been given the privilege of treating
his intangible research and experimental costs, regarded traditionally
in many cases as nondepreciable capital expenditures, as either current
operating expenses, deductible when incurred, or as capital items to be
written off over a five-year period.35
The statute provides this departure from standard in the case of
"research" and "experimental" costs, without defining them. The
Treasury Regulations have attempted to limit the preference to "research and development costs in the experimental or laboratory sense,"
excluding explicitly research expenses incurred in connection with
"literary" and "historical" projects. 6 Thus several judgments have
been made: Congress has decided that research and experiment are
to be encouraged or rewarded, and that granting tax deductions not
available to businessmen who spend money in other ways to reap
their profits is the way to do it. The Treasury Department, on its
own, has decided that the term "research" includes inquiry into new
scientific developments, but does not include research into scientific
history.
The tax lawyer understandably questions the authority of the
Treasury to distinguish laboratory from book research; he and others
may doubt the wisdom of the distinction. One might also question the
congressional judgment that provides relatively permanent support for
laboratory research that includes development of a more exotic lipstick,
a frothier beer, or a less frothy detergent, but continues to deny any
deduction, by way of amortization or otherwise, for the purchase price
1 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 167.
Z2Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6452, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL.
3

128; cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
33

xT. REv. CODE
BuLL. 418.
34 INT.
3

OF

§§ 1001, 1011.

1954, §§ 167(b) (2), (3); Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum.

REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 38.

T. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 174. For a review of research and development
activities and costs see 12 NxATIONA SciENcE FouNDATIoN, op. cit. smpra note 3;
National Science Foundation, Reviews of Data on Research & Development (No. 41,
Sept 1963).
5I

36 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a) (1957).
There is no support for the exclusion of
literary and historical research in either of the committee reports. See H.R. REP.

No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A57-58 (1954) ; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
33 (1954).
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paid, for example, by an expanding concern in the space science
industry for the goodwill of a successful company engaged in electrical
systems research and production.
A deduction serves only to reduce income subject to tax. The
communications firm which is operating at a loss even without a
write-off for laboratory research costs receives no current financial
benefit from the special deduction. If the purpose is to aid scientific
development, and if the work of this firm would make a scientific contribution, it may be just the firm that should be receiving aid. The
tax preference, at least in such a case, fails to achieve its goal.
If the object is to encourage needed scientific development, the
laboratory research write-off must lead one to question whether this
kind of special tax relief can come as close to doing the job as the
federal expenditure. If the object of the write-off is not to benefit
science as such, but rather to provide a fast recovery for the cost of
intangible assets, then the limitation to research and experimental
expenditures is arbitrary. The general rule which defers the recovery
of many intangible capital costs until a business is sold undoubtedly
requires reexamination. Relaxation or reversal of the rule only in
special cases like those involving laboratory expenditures serves to
cloud the fundamental issue of tax equity and to relieve the pressures
that would help create the interest necessary to effect broad based
study and change.
E. Patents and Copyrights
The statutory write-off for research and experimental costs benefits only the successful commercial enterprise. Particularly in light of
the exclision of historical and literary research, the professor and
research scholar working outside the laboratory are beyond its pale.37
The individual who invents, however, is given a very different, favored
treatment.
Ordinarily individuals are taxed on income from their personal
service and business activity at rates ranging from fourteen percent to
seventy percent. 38 Special rates, with a maximum of twenty-five
percent, are applicable to the gains realized from the sale of investments held for more than six months."9 The preferential rate applicable to these capital gains is rationalized usually as a device necessary
to encourage investment or to alleviate the impact of graduated rates
on asset appreciation that may have accrued over a long period of time.
37But ef. Rev. Rul. 63-275, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 85; Wolfman, Professors and the
"Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112 U. P. . L. REv. 1089 (1964).
38 IxT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 1.
88 IhT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §§ 1201-02.
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In recent years Congress has expanded the classification of assets
that qualify for the preferential capital gains tax rate. In 1954 it
utilized the capital gains approach to extend its bounty to inventors.
When his genius has been sufficient to justify the issuance of a patent,
the royalty-type income which an inventor realizes on exploitation of
the patent is now taxable at the lower capital gains rates.4' To the
extent of the federal revenues lost in the rate differential, inventorsscientists-have benefited. The questions that are raised are obvious:
Do people need this encouragement to produce a valuable, patentable
invention? Even if not, should they be rewarded in this special way
if they do produce one? If encouragement and reward are desirable,
why is a special tax rate preferable to direct federal grants?
The creative individual whose talents produce a copyright is
afforded tax treatment polar to that of the inventor. Concerned that
the term "capital asset" might, even without special legislation, be
construed to permit an author to secure the benefit of capital gains on
the sale of his copyright, Congress has amended the law explicitly to
deny capital gains treatment in such a case.' This distinction between
the patent and copyright holder is not without analogue in the
Treasury's distinction between research in the laboratory and research
of an historical or literary nature.4
Even if there is justification for a federal allocation of funds to
the financially successful inventor (a proposition universally denying
such justification may not be self-evident), I have difficulty understanding what might justify using capital gains taxation to achieve this
objective. Its use creates the appearance of arbitrary preference,
and it may be just that.
III.

STRIKING A BALANCE

My sampling of the tax provisions which favor science is not exhaustive. I hope, however, that it will suffice as a backdrop against
40
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235. In substantial part § 1235 represents only the
congressional imprimatur on a result the courts were reaching on their own. President Kennedy sought unsuccessfully to have Congress reverse this result. See Hearings
Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 150 (1963).

41 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 1221(3). Prior to the enactment of this provision
in 1950, the Internal Revenue Service had ruled that General Eisenhower was entitled to capital gains treatment on his sale of the copyright for Crusade it; Europe.
BrrTKER, FEDERAL INcOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 566 (3d ed. 1964). When
§ 1221(3) was proposed, the House of Representatives sought to treat patents and
copyrights alike-both as noncapital assets. The Senate Finance Committee, however, whose view prevailed, felt "the desirability of fostering the work of . . . [occasional] inventors" justified eliminating patents from the noncapital asset category to
which copyrights were assigned. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950-2 Cum.
BuLL. 483, 515.
42 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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which to examine criteria which may help make the choice between
federal expenditure and tax relief less haphazard.
In every case which calls for federal aid to science, I suggest that
the choice of vehicle should be made only after Congress recognizes
and seeks to accommodate the demands of at least three interests which
may be in tension: (1) society's stake in an income tax system with an
essential integrity, (2) society's stake in preserving substantial areas
of activity in which private initiative and management are given relatively free reign, and (3) society's stake in having federally allocated
funds reach their objectives as directly and inexpensively as possible.
Let us look at these sometimes competing, sometimes complementary
interests, and then see if it is possible to strike a workable balance.
A. The Three Interests
1. The Integrity of the Tax System
An income tax system with an essential integrity is one which
is geared as closely as practicable to the determination of economic
net income, with rates applicable to that income without regard to its
source. Such a system treats taxpayers with equal income equally.
It leaves to the forces of the market the allocation of resources. Where
the market place does not operate as desired, it leaves to democratically
elected representatives the reallocation to be made. Reallocation for
welfare, to encourage scientific development, to provide incentive, to
serve as a reward, would be channeled through appropriations. The
reallocation that preferential tax rates, exemptions and deductions
create is eschewed because it is less directed, more likely to be arbitrary,
less susceptible to measure and change. Concern for preservation of
the tax system's integrity suggests recognition of the fact that reallocation of resources through tax preference creates a sense of privilege
for some, undue burden for others. The sense of fairness and equity
that is implicit in a simple tax system, the one with an integrity of
its own, is diminished with each preference that is granted. A tax
system with integrity is a less costly one to operate, for it needs fewer
administrators in government and fewer tax planners outside.
2. Freedom and Encouragement for Private Action
Ours is a society which values highly, even depends upon, private
initiative and follow-through. We seek free competition in ideas as
in prices. Maximum freedom and privacy for the individual, a minimum of governmental restraint, direction and scrutiny-these are the
ideal. To the extent possible the collective goals of society should be
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achieved with minimum interference with this ideal. To some extent,
those goals can be achieved only by fostering the ideal.
3. Care and Efficiency in the Use of Federally
Allocated Funds
When government makes an allocation of funds its citizens are
entitled to know the amount of the allocation and why it has been
made, and that those who authorize the allocation have been satisfied
that it is reasonable in light of the probabilities that it will achieve its
goal. They are entitled to a minimum of waste and the optimum in
expert direction in the deployment of the allocated funds. As Professor
Murphy has said, a system for federal allocation of funds to the
proponent of a research project is "intolerable

the proposer is all that matters."

.

.

.

[if] the name of

4

B. Synthesis and Compromise
The fact is, of course, that the integrity of our income tax has
never been complete. Its history in Congress has been one of repeated
impairment. The oil, gas, and mineral interests and the investors in
real estate and securities have been the principal beneficiaries of these
impairments. It is therefore not surprising that those in science and
other less favored areas have sought their own preferences. They may
have come to see the income tax as a grab bag of favors, available to
the group with the most effective lobbyist. The tax route is preferred
by many of its beneficiaries in no small part because it is less open,
not carefully measured, not reflected in the federal budget and not
subject to periodic congressional review. Some beneficiaries of tax
preference do not accept the preference concept. They view themselves
merely as retaining what is theirs, and they, therefore, perceive no
inconsistency in declaiming publicly against federal handouts and
subsidies.
The advantages which the tax system has over a system of grants
and subsidies lie chiefly in its freedom from government restraint and
interference. Programs need not be approved before a deduction for
a contribution is allowed. The opportunity for diversity and experimentation left open when the charitable deduction and other tax routes
are used to provide federal support are just not feasible when the
43 Professor Arthur W. Murphy made the statement in his paper, "The Law and
Research Supported by Government," April 8, 1965 (delivered at the Conference on
Law and the Social Role of Science, Rockefeller Institute). His paper will appear
in the book collating the proceedings to be published by the Rockefeller Institute
Press.
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federal expenditure is employed. Unfortunately, however, the subsidy
in tax relief is obscured and tends toward permanence. The scientific
beneficiary enjoys obscurity just as the oil man enjoys the lack of light
on the national cost attendant upon his twenty-seven and one-half percent depletion allowance.
The waste and inefficiency that result from the use of the tax
system to provide subsidies are great. Although this method avoids
a bureaucracy of federal experts to approve and supervise expenditures,
it substitutes tax administrators, tax planners and a tradition of protracted administrative controversy and litigation. Funds allocated by
the tax route may, and often do, go to projects with little merit, at
least by comparison with some projects whose claims to funds have
succeeded in competition for direct grants. A "proposer" need not
furnish the federal government with even his name to receive funds
which the tax system allocates. In this respect, we use a system
which, by Professor Murphy's standard, is less acceptable than the
one he suggests would be "intolerable."
When ought society bear the cost and waste-the sense of unfairness and discrimination-that attend tax preferences? Only, I suggest,
when private decision making, free of government interference, is
most compelling. Church support provides the obvious example. If
federally allocated funds are to aid religion at all the exemption of
church income and the charitable deduction are much less likely to
interfere with free religious exercise or tend toward an "establishment"
than is the federal appropriation.
Areas of activity in which we regard initiative, diversity, competition in ideas and experimentation as important also lay cogent
claim to the tax system as a vehicle for channeling needed funds. The
privately supported universities and colleges and many foundations
and scientific organizations provide a vital contribution to the welfare
and future progress of our society. If all the funds allocated to them
through the tax system were reallocated by congressional appropriation,
society would probably be a net loser.
Thus a dual system-government expenditure and private contributions stimulated by tax preference-provides a balance, not a
perfect one, but one which yields security and direction on the expenditure side, while leaving room for flair, style and creativity on the
other.44 I would doubt, however, that there is any value to expanding
the charitable deduction for science beyond the existing thirty percent
44 See SENATE Comm. ON FINANCE, 89th CONG., Ist SESS., TRFAsuRy Dm'ATMENT REPORT ON PRIvATE FOUNDATIONS 1,

11-13 (Comm. Print 1965); Sacks, The

Role of Philanthropy: An Institutioiol View, 46 VA. L. REv. 516 (1960).

TAX POLICY AND SCIENCE

of "adjusted gross income" limitation.45 If nonprofit science is to receive more than the billions it receives by appropriation and the unmeasured sums it receives under existing tax preferences, I think it
wise to subject the additional allocations to the controls which accompany federal expenditure.
Special benefits for science in the businessman's area should be
reexamined. The tax system should treat one businessman seeking a
profit as much like the next as possible. Accelerated depreciation,
investment credits, current write-offs, if they are appropriate to growth
in the economy or a sense of tax equity, should be available across
the board. 46 If a private business is to receive federal support because
of the particular activity in which it is engaged, this support should
be justified in individual cases, in the open, and the subsidy should be
subject to all the controls which are appropriate to a federal expenditure. Private business is entitled to a market reasonably free of "unfair" competition, however, and to this end the provisions which permit
some contract research income to go untaxed in the hands of some nonprofit organizations should be reevaluated.
Tax favoritism for the successful inventor has not been justified.
If he is to seek reward beyond that which the patent monopoly and his
achievements in the market place afford him, he should be made to
fight his case in the subsidy arena. If the image of te successful inventor pleading in public for a subsidy appears ludicrous, it may suggest that his case for tax relief needs similar exposure.
45 A case can be made for the proposition that the deduction be replaced by a
credit against tax. It would provide the same dollar contribution by the Government
for the low bracket taxpayer as for the high except in the case of the low income
taxpayer whose tax absent the credit would not equal the credit. It may be, of course,
that if the percentage of a taxpayer's contribution allowed as a credit were not
sufficient to give a high income taxpayer as much tax benefit as he now receives,
contributions to charity would fall off. The stimulative effect of the deduction for
qharitable contributions has never been measured, however; it has been suggested
that its gross impact is small and that although deductibility probably does motivate
high income taxpayers, gross contributions are increased "by less than the tax relief
granted." Vickrey, One Economist's View of Philanthropy, in PHILANTHROPY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 54 (Dickenson ed. 1962) ; cf. KAHN, PERSONAL DEDucrlioNs IN THE
Professor Vickrey also questions "whether
FEDmAL INCOME TAx 72, 81-82 (1960).

it is sound public policy to . . . subsidize much more heavily the charities favored
by the wealthy as distinct from those appealing primarily to the poorer contributors."
Vickrey, supra at 54. Richard Goode suggests continuing the deduction, but limiting
it to those contributions that exceed a given percentage of income. GOODE, THE
INDIvmuAL INcomE TAx 172-73 (1964).

46A broader, across the board approach might well allow, for example, the
recovery of costs incurred in purchasing good will and securing higher education..
47A fair question is why in any case the active commercial business enterprise is
entitled to greater protection than the taxable passive investor from the competition
of a tax exempt organization. The "greater protection" thesis underlying the 1950
unrelated business income amendment is probably and, I would think, justifiably
based on a concern that tax exempt active businesses can exercise control over market
conditions, especially price, to a much greater degree than can tax exempt passive
investors.
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Scholarships and fellowships present a more difficult problem. If
all such grants were based solely on the recipient's financial need, and
if he had no other income of any significance, exemption of the award
would be a sensible, efficient way to provide a measure of federal aid
to education. In fact, however, many fellowships are granted without
regard to need. They frequently substitute nominally for salaries
which technical personnel, and yes, professors, would be earning
otherwise."
The unevenness of the benefit which fellowship exclusion provides,
the litigation which it fosters, and the waste and inequity involved when
the recipient does not need the support, all suggest that the exclusion
be restricted. Grants to persons working towards an academic degree,
at least a first degree, are likely to be awarded on the basis of need.
Their exclusion might well be continued. All other fellowship awards
should be included in the income base, with appropriate federal aid
supplied by subsidy or loan.
Finally, the darkness should be lifted. The considerations which
permit our sacrificing some of the integrity of the tax system for the
values of private initiative and freedom do not also require that we
be kept in ignorance. The sums federally allocated by tax preferences
and special relief provisions should be reflected in the federal budget
and accounts. This will provide a measure of efficiency even as we
stimulate free private choice. And when new benefits are soughtpercentage depletion for the inventor, an increase in the allowable deduction for scientific contributions, low rates for the space science
company, or deductions to a parent for his child's medical school
tuition-we will be able to ask the estimated cost, appraise it in context with the total federal allocations for science, and expect periodic
verification and review.49
4
sIn some instances, of course, the nonprofit fellowship-granting organization
enjoys part of the benefit of the tax exclusion by making a smaller grant than would
be feasible if the recipient were fully taxable.
491 would hope that no new benefits like those suggested in the text find their
way into the tax law. Preanalysis in the Bureau of the Budget would help to expose
the arbitrariness and extravagance of any attempt to allocate resources to science by
such tax tampering. Compare Hubbell, Concealed Subsidies in the Federal Budget,
10 NAT'L TAX J. 214 (1957). Several tax preferences were recognized recently as
federal subsidies in JOINT ECONOMIc CoMM., 89th CONG., 1st SESS., SUBSIDY AND
SUBSIDY-EFFECr PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (Comm. Print 1965).

